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The abuse of human rights is a problem that pervades most societies of the world. 
In the industrialized countries of the West, it is often charged that the rights of individuals 
are violated through the institutionalized liature of racism, unemployment and 
homel6ssness. The Eastern bloc countries have been charged with the violation of the 
right to free speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought. In the developing sector 
of the world, however, the abuse of human rights takes on a more pernicious form. 
Disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and political killings are a common feature of 
the political landscape in many developing countries. These forms of human rights abuse 
are directed a t  subverting the participation of the masses in the political processes of the 
elites, in large part, by instilling fear in those who might be moved into political action 
(Stohl 1984). 
This article will concern itself with political repression in the developing countries 
of Asia and Latin America. In both academic and social circles it is commonly held that it 
is the military that serves as  the repressive agents in these countries; the assumption 
being that the greater the size of the military the more likely it is that this military 
\ 
capability will be used against the civilian population. After detailing a rigorous and 
operational procedure for measuring levels of political repression, a model is tested which 
postulates that increases in the number of military personnel within a particular country 
will lead to increases in the level of political repression. This relationship is controlled for 
the extent of political association permitted by the ruling coalition, and the existence of 
IMF imposed austerity measures. The results of a pooled time-series analysis suggests a 
counter-intuitive relationship: increases in the number of military personnel will lead to a 
decrease in the level of political repression. 
One of the problems that must be faced in any attempt to describe the magnitude 
of the abuses, the potential causal mechanisms, and possible policy alternatives is the 
limited knowledge base from which both researchers and policymakers operate. As 
scientists we are acutely aware of the need for sys&matic research into the causes and 
correlates of various social phenomenon before we are able to suggest alternative actions 
or potential solutions. The study of human rights abuse is particularly deficient in this 
regard. There is little by way of unbiased and systematic reporting of the number of 
incidents of abuse, or the most persistent offenders. Without such a comprehensive source 
of data it is difficult for researchers to develop generalizable patterns of behavior across 
various regime types, sources of external assistance, level of internal threat, or any 
number of other national attributes which may co-vary with levels of political repression. 
In an effort to move forward our understanding of the causes of political 
repression, I have built on the work of David Cingranelli & Thomas Pasquarello (1985) to 
develop a method of content analyzing the human rights reports of both Amnesty 
International and the US Department of State. The purpose of the research effort was 
twofold: a) to develop a replicable data base that relies on systematic reporting and 
rigorous and operational coding procedures, and b) to test a model suggested by Ted Gurr 
(19 70), Guillermo O'Donnell (1973), and James Zwick (1 984), among others, who argue 
that the increased influence of the military in civilian affairs will lead to an increase in the 
repression of political opponents. 
As various studies have aptly pointed out, the obstacles to rigorous research into 
human rights violations revolve around problems of conceptual definition and data 
acquisition (Goldstein 1986; Stohl, et  al., 1984; McNitt 1986). Relatively recent attempts 
have been made to identify the relationship between US foreign aid and human rights 
abuse in Latin America (Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985; Schoultz 1981; Stohl, et  al. 
1984): but the results remain ambiguous. Much of the problem lies in the development of 
a satisfactory conceptual definition and the development of a replicable data base from 
which scholars can draw. The first problem, a conceptual definition, has been addressed 
fairly rigorously by Christopher Mitchell and a group of colleagues (Mitchell, e t  al. 1986), 
though the second, a reliable and replicable data base, has been far from pinned down 
(Goldstein 1986). In developing a working definition, Mitchell came to rest upon the 
concept of "state terror" (1986); a rather specific way of conceptualizing what is commonly 
understood to be forms of political repression. And while many will claim that political 
repression is by no means limited to the domain of the developing world, this segment of 
the global population seems to have cornered the market on a unique method of carrying 
out their programs. 
Rationale 
The question of why the masses rise up against the state has been addressed 
elsewhere (Tanter & Midlarsky 1966 Gurr 1970), but there is little empirical evidence 
that addresses the question of the state's response to mass demonstrations of discontent. 
There are a few researchers who have posed this question (Falk 1977; Henderson 1982; 
Zwick 1982; Stohl & Lopez 1984; 1986), but none have done the systematic, rigorous work 
necessary to be able to develop valid generalizations. The models proposed by Falk and 
Zwick, respectively, would posit that as militarization increases, political violence follows 
suit. The extractive nature of military spending may not only increase the level of violence 
within these developing countries, but it may also help to institutionalize it. 
There is agreement among researchers into the correlates of human rights 
violations that the most formidable barrier they have to cross is the inadequacy of 
available data (Goldstein 1986; Mitchell, et al., 1986; McNitt 1986; King 1989). There 
are a t  least two relatively sophisticated compilations of human rights violations on a 
country by country basis, Amnesty International's Annual Report and the U.S. State 
Department's Country Reports. And although both of these sources offer broad and 
detailed accounts of the human rights records of each country, both are filled with 
ambiguities and inconsistencies. Charges are made that the State Department's reporting 
is too politically biased to stand on its own (Goldstein 1986; Stohl 1984), while the 
Amnesty report is admittedly and intentionally ambiguous (Stohl 1984). 
Amnesty International's Annual Report is generally considered the most reliable 
and unbiased source of data, despite its inconsistencies and ambiguities. Their policy, 
however, is to make a conscious effort to inhibit the quantifying and ranking of country 
records due to the second hand nature of most of the reported violations and the 
incomparability of data between nations. Amnesty also questions the political wisdom of 
making data available for the ranking of nations according to their levels of abuse (Stohl & 
Lopez 1986). For any particular country the absolute numbers of prisoners or torture 
victims will fluctuate wildly between consecutive years, although Amnesty will report no 
change in the overall level of abuse within the country. 
The State Department's annual County Report is generally considered more 
suspect due to the overtly political nature of the authors' intentions, but it does constitute 
in-depth reporting on violations. Although the Country Reports have been used in the 
study of human rights abuse, it is generally acknowledged that they serve more a s  a 
supplemental source of data than a primary source (Stohl, e t  al. 1984. Cingranelli, 1988). 
In this analysis the Department of State reports was used as both a pretest sample and 
as  a check on the reliability of the resulting political repression scores derived through the 
content analysis of the Amnesty International country reports. 
Two other sources are generally available for those studying human rights 
violations, though these, too, are of questionable reliability. Freedom House (Gastil 1983- 
84, 1988) publishes a ranking of countries as to their degree of freedom, ranging from one 
to seven, including in this scale not only political but civil rights as well. Charges have 
been made that the assigning of scores is based on impressionistic data with the scales 
being "obscure, confusing, inconsistent, and change from year to year" (Goldstein 1986, pg 
620); others argue that Freedom in the World is little more than a scaling of countries a s  to 
their pro-Western sentiments (McNitt 1986) 
The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983) is 
another commonly used source for data on human rights abuse. The Handbook contains 
measures of "state coercive behavior" on a yearly basis, including data on political 
executions. But this data, too, falls prey to questions of definition and is considered to be 
built on "soft" evidence. An example of the limitations due to inadequate definitions by the 
authors can be seen in the number of political executions reported in El Salvador (0) and 
Guatemala (35) during the thirty .years covered by the Handbook (Goldstein 1986, p. 62 1). 
Theoretical Model 
Ted Gurr, in his analysis of why men rebel, suggests that the level of "relative 
deprivation" will explain the propensity of citizens to engage in violence against the state 
(1970). In developing his argument he outlines nine hypotheses which would account for 
political violence directed a t  the state. One hypothesis that is central to his model is that 
the extent of political violence against the state is related to the size and resources of the 
military sector (pg 236). His reasoning follows that at low levels of military manpower 
and resources the masses are relatively free to express their demands to the elites. The 
state, being in a relatively weak position, has few alternatives other than to respond 
through opening a dialog. Political discontent is channeled toward solutions.based on 
political compromise. But as the size of the armed forces controlled by the state increases: 
the level of violence in their response to popular demands increases correspondingly. The 
ruling coalition is no longer limited to political dialog in its attempts to resolve the 
discontent within the masses. The brutality of the state directed response to expressions 
of political disaffection further incites the masses to violently express their demands. As 
state directed violence against the citizenry escalates, so does the level of violence directed 
a t  the state. But a t  a very high level of military manpower and resources, according to 
Gurr, the brutality of the response by the state to expressions of popular discontent is 
particularly harsh, causing the masses to retreat out of fear for personal safety. 
If we accept Gurr's argument as  an empirical assumption, then the hypothesis that 
can be extracted from his analysis is that as the level of military manpower and resources 
within a nation increase, the level of repression directed against the political opposition will 
show a corresponding increase. The thesis that changes in the level of militarization will 
lead to changes in political repression fits with the basic theme of Falk, Zwick, and 
O'Donnell. According to Falk and Zwick, the diversion of resources to the military sector 
will deprive citizens of social needs, possibly leading to the relative deprivation trigger 
addressed in Gurr's model. O'DonnellYs analysis argues that in response to an economic 
crisis, the civilian elites will turn to the military for support in the implementation of 
orthodox economic reforms. The reforms deemed necessary to reorient the economy 
generally hit hardest on the working and lower class sectors of the population; wages are 
cut and subsidies removed. When the masses rise up to express disaffection, the civilian 
elite relies on the military to repress the demonstrations (O'Donnell 1972). The common 
theme that runs through all of these analyses is that of a positive relationship between the 
extent of military involvement in civilian affairs of state and the level of political 
repression. 
But arguing that there is a positive linear relationship between the level of military 
involvement in civilian affairs and the extent of political repression, is far too simplistic a 
model of the referent world. Control variables are needed to account for political and 
economic factors that serve as either triggers or mediating influences. 
In a very interesting and suggestive piece of analysis, David Pion-Berlin (1984) has 
argued that there is a positive relationship between political repression and the 
implementation of orthodox economic stabilization policies in Argentina. His model is very 
similar to that of Guillermo OYDonnell's work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism. He 
argues that as  Argentina faced an economic crisis of inflation, foreign currency depletion, 
and an inability to acquire external credit, they turned to orthodox stabilization programs 
to salvage the economy. Such programs entail currency devaluation, wage freezes, cuts in 
government expenditures, and an increase in taxes. The orthodox doctrines are designed 
to appease the laissez-faire orientation of the international lending institutions which 
require the implementation of austerity measures before granting a "line of credit". 
According to Pion-Berlin, the distribution of costs attributed to the orthodox stabilization 
programs are generally unequal, effecting the worker more than the owner of capital (pg 
102). As government programs are cut the effects on health, education and housing are 
felt most severely by the working class. I t  is also the wage earners who are most severely 
effected by wage freezes and a currency devaluation. In an effort to quell resistance to 
this decrease in the standard of living, and suppress the effects of labor union organizing 
in hampering implementation of the austerity measures, the government resorts to 
political repression. 
Furthermore, I would also argue that as  the level of political development of a 
nation increases, its tolerance of political dissent increases, regardless of the extent of its 
military burden. This would follow from a cursory glance a t  most of the more developed 
nations of the world. There has been an increase in the defense burden experienced by the 
United States, Great Britain and Japan in recent years, yet one would be hardpressed to 
identify an increase in the level of political repression (as operationalized in this project). 
While drawing comparisons between industrialized nations and developing countries can be 
misleading, one might expect that the level of political development would affect a 
governments response to dissent, regardless of the level of economic development. 
The model that was tested in this analysis, therefore, postulates that when 
controlled for the level of political development, increases in the amount of resources 
devoted to the military and the existence of orthodox economic policies, will lead to 
increases in the level of political repression. 
1. Because of the way Freedom House coded their measure of civil liberties, from 1 to 7,  
with 7 being the least free, we would expect to find a positive coefficient associated with 
the POLDEV variable. Although this a t  first seems confusing, the interpretation is that as  
the level of political freedoms decrease political repression increases. This is used solely as  
a control variable, and its ordinal ranking is not meant to convey that changes in the 
Freedom House scaling will affect the level of political repression scoring. If anything the 
reverse should be true. 
Concepts and Definitions 
Having outlined a theoretical model, and before moving on to a discussion of 
research methods, it is necessary to define concepts and identify operational indicators. 
First and foremost, is the narrow category of "political repression" that falls under the 
rubric of human rights abuse. The problem of definition is in dire need of refinement; how 
broadly one defines human rights will virtually predetermine the results of a study. In 
part the definition employed is matter of a particular scholar's objectives, but it is also a 
result of an all-encompassing definition which has been incorporated into international law. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, unanimously adopted by the United Nations in 
1948, consists of 30 articles ranging from the right to employment to the freedom from 
arbitrary detention and torture. In 1976 the Universal Declaration was subsequently 
adopted .as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which transformed the 
principles into treaty. I t  seems evident that before one can put to productive use the vast 
amount of inconsistent and ambiguous data that does exist, what is needed is a conceptual 
framework for the idea of human rights which will permit the collating and integrating of 
the various sources. Until such a definition is formed and agreed upon, human rights 
research will be a scattershot of attempts with very little cumulativeness. 
Christopher Mitchell and others (1986) have developed the outline of a working 
conceptual definition that could enable coherent research in this field to progress. What 
they have settled on is a concept of "state terrorism", of which the main components are, 
a) that the intent of the act of violence is to influence the behavior of a target population, 
b) the means involve the act or threat of violence to some members with whom the target 
population will identify, c) the effects of the violence are to induce fear or terror in the 
target population, and d) the actor is the s ta t . ,  its agents or an approved surrogate group. 
(Mitchell 1986, pg 14). While this definition moves us much closer to an operational 
framework, it has some limiting drawbacks that must be addressed. As a first step I will 
move away from their use of the term "state terror" and adopt a more familiar.expression, 
political repression. There are several reasons for this shift, though a t  the root of political 
repression lies the general tenor of what Mitchell was targeting. 
In requiring that any act of political violence be, a) designed to instill fear or terror, 
and b) have a s  its intended target a population which identifies with the victim, rather 
than the victim itself, their definition becomes very limiting for the purpose of bofh 
developing a data base and investigating the correlates of human rights. Such a definition 
excludes the abuse of an individual or group if they are  the sole target of attack. It  also 
requires the researcher to discern the intentions of the state's actions in carrying out an 
act of violence. Requiring the identification of intention on the part of the attacker, and the 
existence of terror or fear on the part of victims makes virtually any source of information 
unusable. 
In following both the dictates of my model and the limitations involved in adopting 
the concept of "state terror", I have used political repression as  my outcome variable, 
defined a s  follows: any act of political violence carried out against an individual or group 
within a particular country. The act is political if it appears to be the result of organized 
group behavior. The types of violence of central concern to this research effort will be 
confined to arbitrary detention, physical or mental torture, disappearances, arbitrary 
executions, the use of political exile, political trials, and the excessive use of force against 
groups of citizens (i.e., aerial bombings, live ammunition against political demonstrators, 
the massacre of entire villages, etc). In short political repression is the use of coercive 
means that has as its effect the control or elimination of political opposition. A measure of 
political repression will be derived through the application of content analytic procedures to 
Amnesty International's and the US Department of State's annual reports on human 
rights. (This will be discussed more fully below.) 
My predictor variable, the change in the level of militarization experienced by a 
country, also poses problems of definition and measurement. There are a number of 
different methods by which one can identify the extent to which the military sector has 
permeated a society. Henderson (1982) used the military regime as  his indicator of the 
military's influence in a country, but it can be argued that the form of the ruling coalition 
does not necessarily determine the influence of the military; William Dixon and Bruce 
Moon (1987) used a combination of military manpower and the percent of the Gross 
National Product (GNP) spent on the military as  their predictor variable; and Richard 
Hofferbert (1988), in an effort to identify the policy choices of a government, used military 
spending as  a percent of Central Government Expenditures (CGE) as his indicator. My 
concern, however, is with military resources available to a state, and therefore I will use 
as  my indicators of changing militarization the percent of GNP taken up by the military 
and the military participation ratio (Andreski, 1968). Focusing on policy choices (CGE) 
would be insufficient because it would not be possible to identify whether the changing 
ratio was a result of increased military spending or decreased social spending. For 
example, reductions in overall government spending that came solely from that portion of 
the budget designated for social programs, would appear as  increases in the percent of 
CGE devoted to the military. One such mechanism that could have this effect would be 
the privatization of government run industries. Two arguments can be made for my choice 
of indicators of militarization: a) the percent of GNP spent on the military is the most 
commonly used indicator of a military burden ( h s h  1986) and is arguably the most 
inclusive indicator presently available (Maoz, nd), and b) Gurr's thesis on the relationship 
between political violence and the military is built on the number of military personnel per 
total male population and the "resources available to the state" (Gurr 1970: pg 239) 
In an attempt to control for the effects of economic austerity measures on the level 
of political repression, I have included a dichotomous variable in the model which indicates 
whether or not a country subscribed to an IMF loan package in each particular year. The 
assumption here is that adherence to IMF imposed austerity measures is an integral 
component of the agreement between the lendee and the lendor. The indicator is coded 1 if 
. an IMF loan was dispersed, and 0 if there was no IMF loan in each particular year. 
. A reliable measure of political development remains on the "wish list" of many 
social scientists. The tax ratio was used as an indicator of political development in a study 
of the causes and consequences of international war (Organski & Kugler, 1980), but these 
author's used their measure to suggest the level of political development of the state. 
Conceivably one could identify a well organized and developed state apparatus, that  
achieves its level of development through repressive policies of extraction. The type of 
development that  needs to be controlled for in the present model is the extent of 
organizational affiliation by the general population. If there existed a measure of the 
number of secondary associations to which the average citizen of a developing country 
belongs, this would come close to capturing the type of political development that  would 
tend to mediate against the use of political repression. Data on secondary associations in 
the developing world, however, are not readily available. A second best option was to use 
the rankings on civil liberties generated by Freedom House as  the control variable for the 
extent of freedom of political association. Under the rubric of "civil liberties", Freedom 
House includes such categories as: a) freedom of assembly and demonstration, b) freedom 
of political or quasi-political organization, c) freedom to form trade union, peasant 
organizations, or equivalents, d) freedom to organize business cooperatives, and e) freedom 
for professional or other private organizations. The author ranks each country on a scale 
of 1 to 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 the least free (Gastil 1988, p. 54-65). 
Data Generation and Sources 
In  order to derive a reliable measure of the level of political repression in each 
country, the annual reports on human rights abuse of both Amnesty International and the 
US Department of State were subjected to a rigorous procedure of content analysis. My 
sample consisted of 32 countries in Latin America and Asia for the reporting period of 
1976 to 1987 (see appendix for list of countries and rules for exclusion). Data for military 
personnel (per 1000 population) and military expenditures (as a percent of GNP) were 
taken from the U S  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) World Military 
Expenditures 1987 & 1988 Editions. The existence of a program of orthodox economic 
policies was inferred from data on whether a country had purchased adjustment loans 
from the IMF in each particular year. This data was culled from the United Nations 
Yearbook of  Financial Statistics, 1988, under the line item of "loan purchases". In using 
this data as an indicator of orthodox economic programs the assumption was made that 
one of the requirements for an IMF loan is the implementation of an economic reform 
package. Ordinal rankings of the level of political development were taken from the 
Freedom in the World, 1987-88 compilation published by Freedom House (Gastil 1988). 
Research Design 
Before a model could be tested that would identify a relationship between the level 
of militarization and political repression, it was first necessary to tackle that seemingly 
intractable problem of measuring the outcome variable. As the discussion above made 
clear, the sources for data on political repression are such that any attempt to derive a 
rigorous and operational measure would entail a substantial amount of effort. The content 
analytic procedure employed for this purpose required the coding of 736 individual country 
reports. The resulting data consists of political repression scores for 32 countries over a 
12 year period, derived from two separate sources. 
Measuring Political Repression 
In an effort to develop a reliable measure of the level of political repression for each 
country and year, I followed a two-pronged approach. The first step entailed content 
analyzing the human rights reports from the U.S. Department of State, coding data on 
both the subjective level of repression -- from the perspective of the coder -- and on the 
specific number of reported instances of abuse in each of the identified categories. The 
categories of repression for which subjective and actual numbers of incidents were coded 
are: disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, political prisoners, and political killings. 
Three other categories were coded dichotomously: the use of political exile, existence of 
death squads, and the existence of incidents of gross violations of human rights. The 
reporting is rather inconsistent, varying both by country and by year. In many instances 
the actual number of reported violations is specified, requiring the.coder to simply add the 
figures across each category. But in an equal number of cases the reporting consists of a 
textual discussion, using descriptions such as "massive arrests", "a large number of 
victims", or "thousands of people detained". If the data are presented as  actual numbers, 
they were recorded as  such; if data were presented in the latter fashion, a subjective 
evaluation was used to record abuses in that particular category. A probability density 
plot was generated from data on actual numbers of reported cases in each category. Tri- 
modal distributions were then used to suggest cutoff points for the subjective coding aspect 
of the Amnesty International reports. 
The same procedure was then applied to the annual reports of Amnesty 
International, coding both subjective levels and actual numbers of reported incidents. This 
time, however, the subjective levels were guided by the distribution of reported cases based 
on the State Department's analysis. As a check on the cutoff points suggested by the 
Department of State reporting, a similar probability density function was plotted for the 
actual number of reported cases based on Amnesty's analysis. The tri-modal distributions 
for each category were remarkably similar when the plots developed with Amnesty 
International data were compared to those generated from State Department data. 
The end result of this procedure was a four-level scale on the extent of the reported 
violation of each of five forms of political repression. The levels were: none, several, 
many and numerous; each was assigned a numerical value of zero, one, two and three, 
respectively. The three dichotomously recorded types of repression were assigned a zero 
(no reported cases) and one (reported cases) value. The scores across all eight indicators 
were summed to form a political repression score (POLREP) for each c o ~ n t r ~ l ~ e a r . ~  
Although reports were available for nearly every country and year, there were instances 
of missing data. Of the possible 384 cases, 27 countrylyears went unreported by Amnesty 
International. The summary statistics on the political repression variable can be found in 
Table 1. Inter-coder tests were performed to check the reliability of this procedure, using 
both different coders and recoding by the principle investigator four months after the 
original coding was performed. These inter-coder tests achieved a reliability of .95 against 
the summed political repression score, and a mean inter-coder score of .90 against the five 
individual indicators. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Political Repression Score 
Standard 
N Min Max Mean Deviation 
Due to questions of reporting biases and concerns about validity, the composite 
political repression score used in the analysis was based solely on data generated from the 
Amnesty International reports. There seemed to be little theoretical justification for 
simply combining the data from the two sources into one composite score, and concerns 
about the overtly political nature of the State Department reporting process argued 
against relying primarily on their reports for the analysis of the data. Since the State 
Department's reports were also used as  a pretest to help perfect the procedure, the 
2 The result is a somewhat sophisticated measure of the level of state directed violence. 
I t  is not always clear, however, who committed a particular act, say, the appearance of 
bodies on the side of the road. But such ambiguous reports were recorded as  state 
repression nonetheless. A fair argument can be made that most of the reported and coded 
instances of repression were committed by the state: ie, political prisoners, arbitrary 
arrests, disappearances, exile, and torture are generally state sponsored acts of terror. 
Political killings are much less clear. The results of the pooled analysis are virtually the 
same when data political killings were deleted from the POLREP score. 
resulting data is arguably less reliable. The correlation between composite scores derived 
from each source was .70. 
Coding Criteria 
An integral element in making content analysis a useful tool for the development of 
theory in the social sciences is the employment of strict operational criteria by which data 
are coded. It is primarily through the use of operational criteria that research becomes 
replicable, biases and assumptions are made known, and knowledge becomes cumulative. 
Therefore, I will take the necessary space to make explicit the operational criteria by 
which cases of abuse were coded. 
1. -Disappearances: A disappearance is an unexplained absence of a citizen that 
can or has been attributed to the activities of the government or actors on the behalf of the 
government. Kidnapping is distinct from disappearance in that kidnapping is the holding 
of a person for ransom or some other demand to be met. The fact that the kidnapped 
person has been "apprehended" is acknowledged, whereas in the case of a disappearance 
there is no word as  to the persons whereabouts, although it is suspected that the person 
has been "apprehended". 
2. Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrest is when a person is held without the filing 
of charges. Persons detained during general sweeps of an area by government forces, are 
considered to be arbitrary arrestees. Any time a person is "briefly detained" or held for a 
"few hours and released", held in detention for long periods of time without charges, or 
"abducted" by "plainclothed men in vehicles" and subsequently taken to a prison and held 
in detention, can be considered a s  an arbitrarily arrest if no charges are filed. Coding 
should consist of both the number of people detained in each year and the number who are 
held without charges from previous years. 
3. Torture: Torture is considered physical, mental, or emotional abuse by those 
holding a prisoner in detention. Rape, deprivation, and mock executions are classified as 
torture, as  are beatings or other methods used to break the will of the prisoner. A person 
who is subjected to harsh or brutal conditions while in prison is not considered to be a 
torture victim. The distinction between harsh treatment and torture revolves around 
whether it is an ongoing situation while under detention or a deliberate policy to break the 
prisoner. The arrest itself, even if there is a pattern to the harassment, is not considered 
torture. Only those reported cases for the particular year under examination are valid. 
4. Political Killings: Political killings are deaths resulting from torture while a 
prisoner is in detention, summary executions, assassinations of political opponents, random 
murder of villagers by government forces or by opposition forces, or any other killings 
related to political violence or rioting. If the actions cannot be distinguished from murder 
as  a crime then it must be classified as  a political killing. Deaths resulting from direct 
confrontations between opposing military forces, such as  an insurgent group and the 
government army are not considered political killings. However the indiscriminate killing 
of civilians "caught in the crossfire" of a governmentlinsurgent battle, is considered 
political killings. The reasoning being that we cannot distinguish whether or not it was 
intentional, or in fact whether there really was a military battle. Only killings that have 
taken place in the current year are valid. 
5. Political Prisoners: A political prisoner is a person who is incarcerated and 
charged with an offense for histher political views andlor the expression thereof. People 
who are charged with a criminal offense carried out for political reasons can be considered 
a political prisoner if they are deemed so by the relevant source. A political prisoner is 
distinct from a person who is "arbitrarily arrested" in that the former has been officially 
charged with a crime, and if tried, sentenced to a term in prison; the latter is someone who 
has not been tried or charged. This is a cumulative category, including both those charged 
in the current year and those serving sentences from past convictions. 
6. Gross Violations of Human Rights: A gross violation of human rights is an 
act by the government, or the military, in which large numbers of civilians are killed or 
injured during one incident. An example of this might be the military opening fire on a 
crowd of demonstrators, the indiscriminate bombardment of villages, or the mass 
executions of political opponents. Terrorist activities that kill large numbers of civilians 
can be considered a gross violation of human rights. The deaths that are included in this 
category should also fall into the count for political killings. Only incidents that have taken 
place in the current year are applicable. 
7.  Death Squad Activity: Any indication from the source that death squads are 
operating in the country, either with or without the consent of the government. Death 
squad activity cannot be inferred from reports of deaths or the disappearance of people, 
but must be explicitly referred to in the country report. 
8. Political Exile: Political exile is the banishment of citizens of the particular 
country being coded to either remote internal locations or to another country,. against the 
will of the exilee. Voluntary exile by political dissidents, or the expulsion of non-citizens is 
not to be considered political exile. 
Data Analysis 
A three step process was used to test both the direction and strength of the 
hypothesized relationships. The first was to run a pooled time-series analysis, based on a 
cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive model, for an eleven year 
period and each of the 32 countries in the sample (see Table 2). If the hypothesis being 
tested is correct, then one would expect to find a positive linear relationship between the 
predictor variables, military expenditures, military personnel, and the purchase of IMF 
loans, and the outcome variable, political repression. The second step consisted of using 
time-series regression analysis, based on an ordinary least squares model corrected for 
autocorrelation (see Table 3). The results of this type of analysis would identify the 
strength and direction of the relationship within each particular country, and would also 
highlight any changes in strength or direction that may suggest that another intervening 
variable needs to be taken into account. And finally, a cross-sectional model was tested, 
again using a least squares procedure (see Table 4). The results of the cross-sectional 
analysis would show if there were any global patterns specific to particular time periods 
that may have been negated by the pooling of data over the entire temporal domain. 
Conversely, it may be possible for a global trend in any one particular year, or the 
strength of the relationship in any one particular country to skew the strength and 
direction of the pooled analysis. 
Findings 
The results of the pooled time-series analysis, as the model was originally specified, 
suggest that the relationships are in the exact opposite direction of those hypothesized 
(Table 2). In the full model, using both indicators of military resources, the negative 
coefficients associated with military spending and military personnel would suggest that 
a s  the strength of the military increases, the level of political repression decreases. 
Likewise, the results convey that the subscription to IMF austerity measures serves to 
decrease the amount of reported political repression for that particular year. 
The relationship between the Freedom House measure of civil liberties and the 
political repression score derived through content analysis, follows the hypothesized 
direction, though statistically the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. With findings 
that run so highly counter to the theoretical arguments outlined above, one must first look 
for other, more definitive tests, before proclaiming that increases in military resources in 
the hands of political elites restrains their propensity to repress. 
Table 2: Pooled Time-Series hgression, Outcome Variable: Political Repression, 1976- 
1987* 
Minus MILEX; Asia: Latin 
America: 
Minus Lagged Lagged Lagged 








of the Estimate 
N 
Time Periods 
* Due to missing data the number of time periods will be less than the full twelve years. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
a Model as specified in text: y = a + $1 + $2 + $3 + $4 + e; where $1 = MILPER, $2 
= MILEX, 83 = IMF, 84 = POLDEV. 
Due to the highly co-linear relationship between MILEX and MILPER, MILEX was 
dropped from the equation. The decision to drop MILEX rather than MILPER was 
based on theoretical concerns. 
Two factors come immediately to mind. The first is that military spending and 
military personnel are highly co-linear, causing the statistical procedure to be inefficient. 
After tests confirming an unacceptable level of co-linearity between the two military 
indicators, military spending was dropped from the equation (Table 1, column 2). The 
decision to drop military spending, rather than personnel, was based on theoretical 
grounds, stemming mainly from Gurr's analysis relating the number of military personnel 
to the level of political violence. Again the coefficient assigned to military personnel is 
negative, though this time its statistical significance is quite high. The direction of the 
relationship between economic austerity measures and political repression reverts to the 
hypothesized direction, but it looses its statistical significance. Controlling for political 
development again confirms the hypothesized direction, though now it, too, becomes 
statistically significant. This, however, does little to answer the question of why the 
counter-intuitive results associated with the military participation variable. 
The second place to look for a change in the direction of the findings might be in the 
time periods for which one expects to find a causal relationship. I t  would seem plausible to 
assume that an increase in military personnel a t  time 'ty would not affect the level of 
political repression until some future date; the same argument could be made regarding 
the subscription to IMF austerity measures. I t  would seem reasonable to assume that the 
affects of economic stabilization measures and military personnel would become evident in 
the year following their implementation. That same argument, however, could not be 
made with regards to the political development score derived from the Freedom House 
rankings. When the military participation ratio and IMF loans are lagged one year, the 
findings for the pooled analysis do not change drastically in either strength or the 
direction (Table 2, column 3). The greatest change can be seen is in the affect of economic 
austerity programs on political repression. The lagged coefficients convey that a one unit 
increase in the military participation ratio will lead to a .1 unit decline in the political 
repression score and the subscription to IMF austerity programs will lead to a .42 unit 
increase in political repression. 
A time-series analysis of the data shows a somewhat less rigid relationship 
between the predictor and the outcome variables, though in most cases tests of statistical 
significance does not allow one to have much confidence in the strength and direction of the 
coefficients that are presented (Table 3). In certain countries, however, the model appears 
to be moderately supported by the data. For example Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Honduras, 
Colombia and Costa Rica all seem to suggest that an increase in military resources will 
lead to a n  increase in political repression, though the effect of orthodox economic policies 
does not consistently follow the hypothesized model, even in these cases. 
Table 3: Time-Series Regression Modela 
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.16 7.99 .46 .35 .74 
(2.37) (5.04) (.30) 
-1.72 -.55 -.43 19.7 .23 
(- 1.76) (-. 7 1) (-. 37) 
Insufficient degress of freedom due to missing data 
.34 b .56 1.18 -.05 
(.28) (1.30) 
-2.54 2.43 -3.82 39.04 .33 
(-1.92) (.%I (-1.30) 
9.43 -1.54 -1.35 -13.9 -.I1 
(1.71) (-.53) (-1.38) 
10.55 .17 4.11 -20.98 .71 
(1.79) (.OBI (3.10) 
. O 1  b .23 1.42 -.09 
(.09) (.84) 
-.22 .36 -.27 4.74 -.3S 
(-. 17) (.61) (-.59) 
5.77 1.81 2.77 -64.7 . 8 O  
(1.87) (1.36) (4.32) 
-4.17 b b 20.14 . O 1  
(-1.05) 
2.03 
(DF = 5) 
1.91 
(DF = 6) 
2.09 
(DF = 8) 
1.73 
(DF = 6) 
1.53 
(DF = 6) 
1.93 
(DF = 6) 
2.18 
(DF = 8) 
1.85 
(DF = 6) 
2.04 
(DF = 6) 
2.19 
@F=7) 
a Unless otherwise indicated, the model was corrected for timewise autocorrelation using 
the Corchrane-Orcutt procedure. 
Complete model could not be estimated due to a lack of variance in the indicated 
variable. 
* Model estimated using a Generalized Least Squares estimation procedure to correct for 
heteroskedasticity associated with MILPER. 
The results of the cross-sectional analysis do not substantially alter the picture that 
seems to be taking shape regarding the direction of the hypothesized relationships (Table 
4). In all years there is a negative coefficient associated with the military participation 
ratio, and in seven of the eleven years the relationship is significant a t  the .05 level or 
better. The strength and direction of the effect of economic austerity measures on political 
repression levels is less consistent than that of military participation ratios. In only one of 
the years is the coefficient associated with IRW loans statistically significant: and in three 
of the eleven years a positive relationship is identified. The level of political development 
showed a consistent positive relationship to political repression, but again, only a few of 
the coefficients were statistically significant a t  the .05 level. 
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Regression Model" 
Year MILPER IMF POLDEV Constant R~ S.E.E. 
* Based on 32 countries, but due to missing data the actual number of 
countries 
in any one period may be less than 32. T-ratios are in parentheses. 
The interpretation of the cross-sectional analysis does not change much from that 
of the pooled time-series evaluation. Again, in any one year it would appear that an 
increase in military personnel will lead to a decrease in the level of political repression; the 
implementation of orthodox economic stabilization policies does not trigger a repressive 
response from the state; and the level of political development does not appear to constrain 
the behavior of the state. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of cross-tabular analysis between a collapsed 
version of the political repression indicator and both military personnel data (again, 
collapsed to facilitate contingency table analysis) and a three-category typology of regime 
type. Both a visual examination of the tables, and the supporting statistics, confirm the 
findings of the regression analysis. The cross-tabular relationship between regime type 
and political repression, however, suggests that the greater the military involvement in the 
ruling coalition the greater the level of political repression (Table 6).3 With so much 
empirical evidence running counter to the hypothesized relationships, what can be made of 
the analysis presented above? Is the problem in the theoretical model, the tools of 
analysis, or in the choice of indicators and their subsequent measurement? 
Discussion 
Assuming for a moment that the model is correct, and that an  increase in the 
military resources available to the state will lead to an increase in the level of political 
repression. Similarly, the imposition of economic austerity measures will lead to 
increasing discontent within the populace and a repressive response by the state. Then the 
results of this analysis suggest that the first place to look for an  answer to our counter- 
intuitive results must be to the indicators used to measure the constructs in question. 
While it is generally acknowledged that the level of militarization of a state is a 
tricky concept to operationalize and measure, the most common indicators employed are 
3. See Conway Henderson (1982), Military Regimes and Rights in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Perspective, for a discussion about the relationship between regime type and 
human rights. 
military spending1GNP and military participation ratios (Dye and Zeigler, 1989). But 
neither of these measures sufficiently tap the depth to which the military sector and its 
accompanying attitudes have permeated the society. As we have seen in a number of 
contemporary examples, the existence of a large military does not always equate with the 
ability to repress. During both the 





1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 Row 
.Total 
Column Total 141 106 6 6 30 9 352 
40.1 30.1 18.8 8.5 2.6 100.0 
Chi-square 44.09 DF=16 p < .0002 
Kendal's Tau b -.I7 p < .OOOO 
Pearson's R -.24 p < .OOOO 
* Political Repression score collapsed into five categories: 0,1,2,3 = 1; 4'5'6 = 2; 7,8,9 
= 3; 10,11,12 = 4; 13,14,15 = 5. 
**  Military PersonneVlOOO collapsed into five categories: 0 to 1.99 = 1; 2.0 to 4.99 = 2; 
5.0 to 9.99 = 3; 10 to 15.99 = 4; 16 and up = 5. 





Civilian Mixed Military RowTotal 
Column Total 
Chi-square 25.3 DF=8 
Kendal's Tau c .20 
Pearson's R .24 
*: Data on Regime Type taken from Ted Gurr's "Polity 11" data set (Gurr et  
al., 1989). 
*' Political Repression score collapsed into five categories: 0'1'2'3 = 1; 4'5'6 
= 2 ;  7 ,8 ,9= 3; 10 ,11 ,12=4;  13'14'15 = 5 .  
Filipino and Romanian political revolutions the military chose not to put down the popular 
uprisings, while the people of El Salvador and China have witnessed the slaughter of 
civilians by the military. So it is not necessarily the size of the military that dictates its 
ability to repress, but there is an attitudinal component that must be incorporated into the 
construct (Finer 1988). The extent to which the society has become militarized, and 
therefore military repression is viewed as an acceptable tool in maintaining order, may tell 
us more about the extent to which the state can rely on the military to subvert the political 
process. I t  becomes incumbent on researchers who seek answers to questions regarding 
the effect of militarization on societies to dig deeper than a mere reliance on available 
aggregrlte data, data which was collected for widely different purposes. 
The measure of political repression offered in this analysis may also be in need of 
refinement. A four-level categorization of such a varying concept as  political repression is 
bound to limit precise discrimination. The potential variance in the scope of repression in 
each level and category can certainly cause problems when one is looking to identify the 
effects of changing patterns. It could be that the hypothesized effect is taking place but it 
could only be picked up by a much more discriminating measure of repression. There is an 
obvious trade-off, however, between the breadth of the scale developed and its reliability. 
An under-specified model is another potential source for the counter intuitive 
findings. Gurr's hypothesis of a curvilinear relationship between the military manpower 
and resources of the state and the violence against it, was predicated on the existence of 
political violence. Although Falk and Zwick's analysis, respectively, is not violence based, 
it is possible the current model under analysis needs to be controlled for the present of 
violence against the state. The state with a perfectly peaceful and contented populace may 
find little reason to engage in repressive activities, regardless of the amount of resources it 
diverts to its military sector. And though a cursory glance a t  the countries included in this 
analysis would suggest that most experience a t  least a modicum of political violence, a 
control variable for either the existence or level of violence within the state, or the 
existence of "radical" political parties may help to discriminate between military resources 
devoted inwardly for those with an external orientation. 
Controlling for the existence of either and external threat or external violence may 
also be a necessary component of an adequately specified model. A country engaged in 
external hostilities is very likely to increase the size and resources of its military sector. 
At the same time, domestic opposition may decrease in response to the external threat. 
The security dilemma, as it is commonly understood, argues that an increase in the 
military capabilities of an antagonist country will lead to a reciprocal response from the 
country under observation. Likewise, if the ruling coalition generates a sense of 
nationalism in response to the perceived external threat, one would expect to observe 
simultaneously both an increase in military resources and a decrease in political violence. 
A further case can be made that it is not primarily the military that is the 
instrument of repression, but rather paramilitary forces that operate a t  the behest of the 
military (Janowitz, 1977). There are problems -- both analytical and practical -- that 
inhibit adopting this approach to the analysis. The practical issues revolve around access 
to adequate sources of data; analytical problems stem from the discrimination of the 
military from the paramilitary. As Janowitz puts it, "the military often supply the 
weapons and training for paramilitary forces and carry out inspections. Frequently 
personnel are interchanged, especially a t  the higher levels, and such exchanges are 
designed to reinforce the dominance of the armed forces (Janowitz, 1977:31). 
Now if we relax for a moment the assumption that the model is correct, if not 
misspecified, there may be an alternative hypothesis that could be offered. Langton 
(1984) has examined the influence of military service on the social consciousness and 
propensity to protest of Peruvian mine workers. His conclusions are that "military service 
retards the development of class awareness..[and] reduces their participation in strikes 
and political demonstrations, and eases their insertion into the hierarchy and discipline of 
the work place" (p. 497). From these findings he suggests that for "those elites interested 
in political order and labor discipline, these data must be reassuring and the policy 
implication obvious -- draft greater number of workers into the military" (ibid.). If 
Langton is correct, and military service serves to decrease the protest behavior of 
veterans, then one might expect that the higher the military participation ratio the more 
veterans in the workforce; the more veterans in the workforce, the lower the level of 
protests and labor strikes; and the lower the level of political violence against the state, the 
less repression by the state. Following this line of reasoning, one would suggest that an 
alternative hypothesis to the model tested here would posit that increases in the military 
participation ratio would lead to a decrease in political repression. For the most part, a 
relationship confirmed by this analysis. 
The conclusions to be drawn in light of the disconfirmation of the model should not, 
however, immediately gravitate toward the stabilizing role of the military. Disconfirming 
any model is not the definitive test of causal relationship. Rather, science can only 
progress through the cumulutive knowledge generated by subjecting hypotheses to multiple 
tests and retests, adapting the model where necessary and generating new data where 
possible. The real strength of the analysis presented in this paper lies in the development 
of a rigorous and operational measure of political repression. Further analysis is required 
to be confident in the identification of the factors that determine the scope and intensity of 
repression. 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented here tested a pooled time-series model of the relationship 
between the change in political repression, on the one hand, and changes in military 
participation ratios, economic austerity measures, and political development on the other. 
The hypothesized model posited that increases in the military participation ratio and the 
existence of IMF imposed austerity measures would predict to an increase in the levels of 
political repression; increases in the level of political association would lead to a decrease in 
political repression. 
A political repression score was developed by content analyzing the annual human , 
rights reports of both Amnesty International and the US Department of State. Thirty two 
countries were coded for a twelve year period, 1976 to 1987. Pooled time-series, cross- 
sectional and time-series regression analysis was used to identify the strength and 
direction of the hypothesized relationship. The results suggest that the mechanisms run in 
the opposite direction of theoretical model as  it was proposed. The pooled time-series data 
argues that an increase in military personnel will lead to a decrease in the level of political 
repression. Further analysis tentatively confirmed the direction of the relaiionship. 
A number of factors were identified which may have had a.confounding affect on 
the model. A more precise operationalization and measurement of the predictor variables 
may contribute to analysis that confides greater confidence in the results. Similarly, an 
outcome variable that allows for a greater discrimination between levels of political 
repression should be a necessary component of any retest. The model, as  it was specified, 
may have been missing critical control variables. And finally, an alternative model was 
offered that may suggest that the empirical results identified the correct relationship. 
Increases in military participation may lead to a decrease in political protest, and 
subsequently the motivation for state repression. 
Appendix 
The sample used in this analysis consisted of 32 developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America. Thirty two countries clearly does not include all of the countries in these 
two regions. Countries were excluded for three main reasons: a) size, b) lack of data, and 
c) because the country was either occupied by foreign troops or engaged in a civil war. 
The smaller countries, such as  the island nations of the Caribbean or the "city 
states" of Asia, were excluded for theoretical reasons, even though in many instances 
human rights reports were available. Many, if not most, of these countries, have little or 
no military establishment. Internal security is generally handled by national police forces. 
In some instances, such as Vietnam, Bhutan, and Suriname, there was not enough 
data available from either the human rights or the military personnel source. When this 
problem was encountered the case was simple dropped from the analysis. 
For a number of countries, the existence of either a full scale civil war or the 
presence of an invasion force confounded the theoretical inferences that could be drawn 
from the analysis of military data. Examples are Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and El 
Salvador. McCormick and Mitchell (1988) argue that El Salvador should be included in 
any such analysis of human rights, but for reasons of the extent and source of their 
military resources, El Salvador was dropped from the sample. 
China may be an unfortunate instance of excluding a country for all the wrong 
reasons. China was originally dropped from the analysis because although it can be 
categorized a s  a developing country, it is also considered to be one of the major powers by 
many analysts. In hindsight this may have been an oversight, but the strength of the 
pooled findings are such that it is doubtful that the inclusion or exclusion of one country 
would alter the direction of the results. 


































Andreski, Stanslav, . . Military Orea nization 8= Society, University of California 
press', 1968. 
Banks, David L., "The.Analysis of Human Rights Data Over Time," Human 
E i ~ h t s  Quarterlv, Nov. 19, 1986. 
Benoit, Emile, Defense and Economic Growth in Developin? Countries, Lexington 
Books, 1973. 
Cingranelli,' David, Current research in progress, communicated through personal 
correspondence, Oct. 1988. 
Cingranelli, David L. and Thomas E. Pasquarello, "Human Rights practices and 
the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries," American a 
Journal of Political Science. 1985, vol 29. 
Dixon, William J. and Bruce E. Moon, "The Military Burden and Basic Human 
Needs," Journal of Conflict Resolution. vol. 30, no. 4, Dec. 1986. 
Dye, Thomas R. and Harmon Zeigler, "Socialism and Militarism," PS: Political 
S . j J  vol. 22, no. 4, Dec. 1989. 
Falk, Richard A., "Militarization and Human Rights in the Third World," Bulletin 
pf Peace Proposal& 8:3, 1977. 
Finer, S.E., The Man on Horseback, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1988. 
'ghts and Civil Libe ies, . .  . Gastil, Raymond D.: Freedom in the World: Political % r t  
Freedom House, Westport, Corn., 1984 and 1988. 
Goldstein, Robert Justin, "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying 
Human Rights Abuses," Human R i ~ h t s  Quarterlv, Nov. 19, 1986. 
Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970. 
Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers and Will H. Moore, Polity I1 Codebook, Center for 
Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, 
Boulder, Co., 1989. 
Henderson, Conway, "Military Regimes and Rights in Developing Countries: A 
Comparative Perspective," Human 3 g h t s  Quarterlv, 1982. 
Hofferbert, Richard I., "The Impact of Policy Choice on Democratic Development in 
Poorer Countries," prepared for delivery to the XTV World Congress of the 
International Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988. 
Hunting-ton, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University 
Press, 1968. 
ion in the Develop' Janowitz, Morris, Military Institutions and Coerc I ~ F  Nations, 
University of Chicago Press, 1977. 
King, Peter John, "Comparative Analysis of Human Rights Violations under 
Military Rule in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay," in Statistical Abstract of 
Latin America, James W. Wilkie and Enrique Ochoa, eds., vol. 27, UCLA Latin 
American Center Publications, University of California, 1989. 
Langton, Kenneth P., "The Influence of Military Service on Social Consciousness 
and Protest Behavior: A Study of Peruvian Mine Workers," Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, Jan. 1984. 
Looney, Robert E., The Political Economv of Latin American Defense 
Ex ~end~ tu res :  Case Studles of Venezuela and Ar~entina, Lexington Books, 
Lexington, MA., 1986. 
Maoz, Zev, "Some Comments on Defense Expenditures and Weapons Inventories 
as  Indicators of Military Power," Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, 
n.d. 
McCormick, James M. and Neil Mitchell, "Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human 
Rights in Latin America?", American Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, Feb. 
1988. 
McNitt, Andrew, "Measuring Human Rights: Problems and Possibilities," Policv 
Studies Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, Sept. 1986. 
Mitchell, Christopher, Michael Stohl, David Carleton and George Lopez, "State 
Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement," in Government Violence and 
Repression, Michael Stohl and George Lopez, eds., Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Conn., 1986. 
. . O'Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studles m 
South American Politim Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of 
California, 1973. 
Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler, The War Led~er ,  University of Chicago Press, 
1980. 
Park, Han S., "Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies," Human Riphts 
Quarterlv, August 1987. 
Pion-Berlin, David, "Theories on Political &pression in Latin America: 
Conventional Wisdom and an  Alternative," B, Winter 1986. 
,'"The Political Economy of State Repression in Argentina," in & 
State AS Terro rist: The Dvnamics of Governmenta 1 Violence and Repres- 
Michael Stohl and George Lopez, eds., Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1984. 
Rosh, Robert M., "The Impact of Third World Defense Burdens on Basic Human 
Needs," b l i cv  Studies Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, Sept. 1986. 
Schoultz, Lars, "US Policy Toward Human Rights in Latin America: A 
Comparative Analysis of Two Administrations," in Global Human R - . . i ~ h t s :  Publicv Policies. Com~arat ive  Measures. and NGO Strategies, Ved P. Nanda, James R. 
Scarritt, and George W. Shepherd, eds., Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1981. 
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton and Steven E. Johnson, "Human Rights and U.S. 
Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter," Journal of Peace Research, 1984. 
Stohl, Michael and George Lopez, Government Violence and Repressim 
Greenwood Press, Westport Conn., 1986. 
, eds., The State As Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental 
Violence and Repression, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1984. 
Tanter, Raymond and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of 
onflict 1966. 
Taylor, Charles and David Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indica-, Vol. 3, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1985. 
Tilly, Charles, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?," Comparative Politic& vol. 
5, April 1973. 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Arms Transfers: 1977-87, Washington, D.C., 1989. 
World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries 1986-87, 
Washington, D.C. 
, Inte r i  nat  onal Financial Statist'cs 1 Yearbook. 1987, Washington, 
D.C. 
Zwicli, J im, "Militarism and Repression in the Philippines," in The State as 
Terrorist: The Dynamics of Go 
. . 
vernmental Violence and R e p r e s s i u  Michael Stohl 
and George Lopez, eds., Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1984. 
Program in Conflict Managanent Alternatives 
WORKING PAPER ORDER EORM 
Please send me the following papers (indicate number of copies): 
Name 
The Program on Conflict Managanent Alternatives 
Male and Female Visions of Mediation (Weingarten, Douvan) 
Equity and the Change Agent (Chesler) 
Levels of Marital Conflict (Weingarten, Leas) 
Self-help Groups as Mediators of patient-provider Conflict in Health Care 
(Chesler ) 
Beyond Agreement (Kohn) 
Institutionalizing Conflict Managanent Alternatives (Manring) 
Action Research in the Voluntary Sector: Activist Roles in Self-Help 
Groups (Chesler) 
"Multiple Levels of Conflict in Everyday Life": A Conference Smary 
A Hybrid Method for Facilitating Negotiation (Chen, Underwood) 
Multicultural Organization Developnent (Jackson, ~olvino). 
Innovative Participation in Neighborhood Service Organizations (Checkoway) 
Facing the Challenge of Diversity and Multi-Culturalism (Katz) 
Changing Organizational Racism: A Workshop for University Staff Leaders 
(Chesler , Hyde) 
Mediating Ethnic Minority conflict in the Classroan: The Case of Blacks 
and Jews (Schoem, Stevenson) 
Difference and Social Justice: A Feminist Perspective (Douvan) 
The Politics of Environmental Dispute Resolution (Rabe) 
Retrieval Conference on Changing Organizational Racism and Sexism (Lewis, 
Linzie , Chesler) 
Neighborhood Needs and Organizational Resources: New Lessons from Detroit 
(Checkoway ) 
Alternative Dispute Resolution/Conflict Intervention and Social Justice 
(Chesler ) 
Racism in Higher Education I: An Organizational Analysis (Chesler, 
Crowfoot) 
Strategies for Social Justice: A Retrieval Conference (with the Conflict 
Clinic, Inc.) (Cunningham, Chesler, Israel [PCMA] and Potapchuk, Blechman 
[=I I 
International Conflict and the Individual . (Weingarten) 
Means of Empowerment in Individuals, Organizations, and Comunities: 
Report on a Retrieval Conference (Gerschick, Israel, Checkoway) 
A Clear and Dangerous Enemy: How Feminist Social Movement Organizations 
Respond to the New Right (Hyde) 
Political Repression in the Developing World: Does the Military Play a 
Role? ( Regan) 
Resolving Conflicts Between Farmer and Creditors: An Analysis of Farmer- 
Creditor Mediation Services (Van Hook) 
* * * * * * * * * 
Address 
Please send $2.50 for each paper ordered to cover shipping and copying costs. Mail form 
and payment to The University of Michigan, PCMA, 4016 LS & A Bldg., Ann Arbor, MI 48109- 
1382. For more information, call (313) 763-0472. 

